Early Marriage and Social Norms: Evidence from India’s Unenforced Child Marriage Ban
(Job Market Paper)
Abstract: Women who marry early have lower female empowerment, less education, and poorer maternal health outcomes. While many countries have implemented laws to increase the legal age of marriage, the global number of child brides remains high, with India as the largest contributor. I analyze India’s 1978 Child Marriage Restraint Act, which raised the legal age of marriage for women from 15 to 18 years. I exploit geographical variation in early marriage social norms combined with differences across cohorts to define exposure to the law, and find that the ban led to a 11.3 percent decrease in the likelihood of marriage before 18, on average. The results are robust to the inclusion of time trends and multiple time varying fixed effects. I rule out the role of differential enforcement capacities and political leadership as a mechanism, and instead suggest that awareness of the ban combined with a perception of enforcement are driving the results. The research makes a significant contribution to our understanding of policy implementation by highlighting the non-sanctionary role of the law in affecting the behavior of individuals.
(Funded by the Center for the Study of Women in Society (CSWS))
Abstract: In Pakistan, approximately 700 men and women are killed every year in the name of honor. This research aims to improve our understanding of “honor” based crimes in two stages. First, I systematically compile a unique data set of honor killings using newspaper reports from 11 local and national news sources, covering 89 districts for 41 months. The data suggests approximately 70% of victims of honor based crimes are young women, while 50% of perpetrators are members of the victim’s natal family. I show that reporting is not biased towards incidents with a higher number of deaths, or more “gruesome” crimes. Second, I show that higher than average rainfall shocks reduce production of cotton, a major cash crop, likely negatively affecting income. I exploit rainfall variation, using the Global Precipitation Measurement satellite data, to examine the effect of income shocks on honor killings. Using a fixed effects Poisson model, I find that a one standard deviation increase in the previous month’s rainfall from the local long run average increases reported honor killing incidents in cotton producing districts by 7.3%. Dry shocks have no significant effect. I interpret these results as suggestive evidence that adverse income shocks are an underlying cause of murder of individuals for “honor”.
Competition in Sibling Fertility? An Analysis of South Asian Joint Households
Abstract: Approximately 20% of households in India have at least one co-residing daughter-in-law. In this research, I examine the hypothesis that the social status of women in joint Indian households is determined by both their husband’s relative age, as well as the gender of their children. Women who marry the elder co-resident son (first rank) have greater decision making power and mobility as a result of being the elder daughter-in-law, compared to women who marry the younger co-resident son (second rank). Thus, first ranking women have less pressure to bear a son to improve their autonomy. Women who marry the younger co-residing son cannot improve their autonomy using rank, and instead have a greater incentive to birth a son. Using the Demographic and Health Survey for India, I provide preliminary evidence that first ranking women increase birth spacing by 9.1 percent on average, upon the entrance of the second rank, even if they have not already borne sons. This delay in births is not explained by a change in early childhood investments. Furthermore, second ranking women reduce their marriage-to-first birth interval by approximately 4.8 percent if the first ranking woman in the household already has a son. Taken together, the results provide suggestive evidence for fertility rivalry within a household, as a means to improve social status.
Research in Progress
Does Side Selling Respond to Interlinked Agricultural Credit? (with Alfredo Burlando)
Matching in an Arranged Marriage Market: An Empirical Analysis Using Novel Data from